

CONCEPTIONS OF THE SELF IN THE *ZHUANGZI*: CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR ANALYSIS AND COMPARATIVE THOUGHT

Edward Slingerland

Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures, University of Southern California

Language belongs in its origin to the age of the most rudimentary form of psychology: we find ourselves in the midst of a rude fetishism when we call to mind the basic presuppositions of the metaphysics of language—which is to say, *of reason*. It is *this* which sees everywhere deed and doer; this which believes in will as cause in general; this which believes in the ‘ego,’ in the ego as being, in the ego as substance, and which *projects* its belief in the ego-substance to all things—only thus does it *create* the concept ‘thing’ . . . ‘Reason’ in language: oh what a deceitful old woman! I fear that we are not getting rid of God because we still believe in grammar. . . .
Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols* ([1889] 1968, p. 38)

The purpose of this article is to explore Nietzsche’s “metaphysics of language” as understood by a fairly new field of inquiry, cognitive linguistics and the contemporary theory of metaphor, with metaphorical conceptions of the self in a fourth-century B.C.E. Chinese text, the *Zhuangzi*, serving as our case example. It will be argued that the contemporary theory of metaphor provides scholars with an exciting new theoretical grounding for the study of comparative thought, as well as a concrete methodology for undertaking the comparative project. What we shall see when we examine the *Zhuangzi* from the perspective of metaphor theory is that conceptions of the self portrayed in this text are based on a relatively small set of inter-related conceptual metaphors, and that the metaphysics built into the *Zhuangzi*’s classical Chinese metaphors resonates strongly with the (mostly unconscious) metaphysical assumptions built into the metaphors of modern American English. This should not surprise us, considering the claims of contemporary cognitive linguists that the metaphoric schemas making up the foundation of our abstract conceptual life are not arbitrarily created *ex nihilo*, but rather emerge from common human embodied experience and are conceptual, rather than merely linguistic, in nature. The stubbornness of the “belief in grammar” that so troubled Nietzsche can thus be located not in language or grammar but in thought itself and—ultimately—in the unavoidable facticity of our embodied existence.

Current Methodologies in Comparative Thought

One method for conducting comparative work that was previously more common, but is now falling out of favor, is based on a kind of word fetishism: a term such as “rationality,” “mind,” or “truth” is taken from the source language (e.g., English), and then an equivalent is sought in the target language (e.g., classical Chinese). The failure to find an equivalent or near-equivalent word in the target language is then

cited as evidence for some sort of deeper cognitive incommensurability. The basic theoretical assumption behind this approach—roughly, that a culture cannot possess a given idea without having a specific word for it—is rather problematic, as has been adequately demonstrated in the sinological context by A. C. Graham (Graham 1989, p. 396). The more common approach nowadays is to undertake comparison at a theoretical level. In this approach, a particular philosophical theory is taken from the source culture and compared to a particular philosophical theory from the target culture. A lack of fit between these theories is then taken to represent cognitive incommensurability, or at least profound difference.¹ In the field of Western-Chinese comparative studies of the “self,” the source theory is generally the Cartesian conception of the self, which is—quite rightly—seen as being quite different from traditional conceptions of the self, whether ancient Greek or ancient Chinese. As Charles Taylor notes in his now classic *Sources of the Self*, it has become something of a truism in the humanities that “our” conception of the self is a peculiarly modern, Western achievement (Taylor 1989, p. 111). The idea of “the” self as an object that can be found or lost and a sharp distinction between inner and outer (mapped onto a mind-versus-body dichotomy) are the hallmarks of this “historically limited mode of self-interpretation” (ibid.), the genealogy of which Taylor so skillfully traces from St. Augustine to Descartes and Locke.

That we in the modern West are all thoroughgoing Cartesians has thus been the guiding assumption in most recent studies of early Chinese conceptions of the self, most of which see as their task to demonstrate just how alien and non-Cartesian these conceptions are. David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, for instance, declare that “the interpretative vocabulary associated with Chinese constructions of what we would identify as ‘self’ or ‘person’ is radically distinct from that drawn from the primary semantic contexts forming the major interpretative constructs in our tradition,” and conclude that, from a Western perspective, “the Chinese are, quite literally, ‘selfless’” (Hall and Ames 1998, p. 23). In his discussion of the Chinese conception of physicality, Roger Ames is led so far as to assert that “the Chinese are truly a different order of humanity” (Ames 1993, p. 149).²

My purpose here is neither to minimize the gulf between Descartes and, say, the author of the *Zhuangzi* nor to deny the influence that Enlightenment philosophical theories of the self have had on our modern Western self-conception. My claim is rather that philosophical theories concerning such abstract concepts as “the self” are parasitic on previously existing folk theories of the self,³ which in turn arise out of conceptual metaphorical structures built into colloquial language. Despite the surface differences between, say, the Cartesian and Zhuangzian conceptions of the self, both of these philosophical conceptions grow out of and make use of a deeper metaphysical grammar that has its roots in a common human embodied experience. In this respect, I concur with Eliot Deutsch, who has argued that comparative work carried on at either the level of specific terminology or the level of philosophical theory misses the important level in between that represents a “common core” or “deep grammar” of human experience (Deutsch 1992, pp. 95–97).⁴ This is not to claim that “the self” as some manipulable, bounded object is “real” in the same

sense that my infant nephew's milk bottle is real, but only that our common human history of interactions with a host of such objects as milk bottles and bodies makes the emergence of such metaphors for the self almost inevitable for creatures like us.

Cognitive Linguistics and the Contemporary Theory of Metaphor

Before proceeding to our examination of the *Zhuangzi*, it would be helpful to provide a brief introduction to the comparative methodology being proposed. Cognitive linguistics and metaphor theory are perhaps most familiar to the general academic public through the works of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, who see themselves as being engaged in a kind of "descriptive or empirical phenomenology" aimed at sketching out a "geography of human experience" (Johnson 1987, p. xxxviii).⁵ One of the basic tenets of the cognitive-linguistics approach to metaphor is that human cognition—the production, communication, and processing of meaning—is heavily dependent on mappings between domains, with "mapping" understood as "a correspondence between two sets that assigns to each element in the first a counterpart in the second" (Fauconnier 1997, p. 1) Another tenet is that the process of human cognition is independent of language, and that linguistic manifestations of cross-domain mappings are merely manifestations of deeper cognitive processes.⁶ These mappings take several forms, but perhaps the most dramatic form—and the form we shall be primarily concerned with here—is what Fauconnier refers to as "projection mappings" (1997, p. 9), where part of the structure of a more concrete or clearly organized domain (the source domain) is used to understand and talk about another, usually more abstract or less clearly structured, domain (the target domain). It is this sort of projective mapping that we shall be referring to as "metaphor," which—understood in this way—encompasses simile and analogy as well as metaphor in the more traditional sense.

Our primary and most highly structured experience is with the physical realm, and the patterns that we encounter and develop through the interaction of our bodies with the physical environment therefore serve as our most basic source domains. These source domains are then called upon to provide structure when our attention turns to the abstract realm. Probably the most crucial claim of cognitive linguistics is thus that sensorimotor structures play a crucial role in shaping our concepts and modes of reasoning.⁷ The most basic of these structures are referred to as "primary schemas"—"dynamic analog representations of spatial relations and movements in space" (Gibbs and Colston 1995, p. 349)—that come to be associated with abstract target domains through experiential correlation, resulting in a set of "primary metaphors." Lakoff and Johnson (1999, pp. 50–54) provide a short list of representative primary metaphors (derived from Grady 1997) such as AFFECTION IS WARMTH, IMPORTANT IS BIG, MORE IS UP,⁸ et cetera, specifying their sensorimotor source domains and the primary experience correlations that give rise to them. Two examples (from Lakoff and Johnson 1999, pp. 52–53) that we shall invoke below are:

(a) PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS

Subjective Judgment: achieving a purpose

Sensorimotor Experience: reaching a destination

Example: "He'll ultimately be successful, but he isn't *there* yet."

Primary Experience: reaching a destination in everyday life and thereby achieving a purpose (e.g., if you want a drink, you need to go to the water cooler)

(b) ACTIONS ARE SELF-PROPELLED MOTIONS

Subjective Experience: action

Sensorimotor Experience: moving one's body through space

Example: "I'm *moving* right along on the project"

Primary Experience: common action of moving oneself through space.

It is important to note that schemas understood in this way are based on experiential correlation, rather than preexisting similarity, and that they represent analog or image "irreducible gestalt structures" (Johnson 1987, p. 44)—including entities, properties, and relations—rather than propositions. Thus, the phrase PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS should be seen as a shorthand way to refer to "the complex web of connections in our experience and understanding formed by this mapping across domains of experience" (Johnson 1987, p. 7) rather than a propositional statement; "the metaphor itself is not reducible to the proposition we use to name it" (ibid).

Traditional theories of metaphor usually portray it as a relatively rare and somewhat "deviant" mode of communication thrown in to add rhetorical spice, but fully reducible to some equivalent literal paraphrase. Metaphor understood in this way is thus viewed as a purely optional linguistic device. An important claim of the cognitive approach to metaphor is that metaphor is, in fact, primarily a matter of *thought*, not language, and that conceptual metaphor is ubiquitous and unavoidable for creatures like us.⁹ Conceptual metaphor, it is claimed, serves as one of our primary tools for reasoning about ourselves and the world—especially about relatively abstract or unstructured domains. While abstract concepts such as "time" or "death" may have a skeleton structure that conceptually is represented directly (i.e., non-metaphorically), in most cases this structure is not rich or detailed enough to allow us to make useful inferences. Therefore, when we attempt to conceptualize and reason about abstract or relatively unstructured realms, this skeleton structure is fleshed out (usually automatically and unconsciously) with additional structure provided by the primary metaphors derived from basic bodily experience, often invoked in combination with other primary schemas to form complex metaphors or conceptual blends. When primary or complex source domains are activated in such cases and mapped onto the target domain, most aspects of the source-domain conceptual topology—that is, inference patterns, imagistic reasoning patterns, salient entities, et cetera—are preserved, thereby importing a high degree of structure into the target domain.¹⁰

To give an illustration of this process: consider the question of how we are to

comprehend and reason about something as abstract, for instance, as “life.” Lakoff and Johnson (1999, pp. 60–62) note that, when reasoning or talking about life, English speakers often invoke the complex metaphor, A PURPOSEFUL LIFE IS A JOURNEY, which provides them with a schema drawn from embodied experience. This schema is based on the two primary metaphors mentioned above, PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS and ACTIONS ARE SELF-PROPELLED MOTIONS—two schemas that have become a part of our conceptual “toolbox” through experiential correlation. When these two primary metaphors are combined with the simple fact (derived from our common knowledge of the world) that a long trip to a series of destinations constitutes a journey, we have the complex metaphor schema, A PURPOSEFUL LIFE IS A JOURNEY, which Lakoff and Johnson map as follows:

Journey	→	Purposeful Life
Traveler	→	Person Living a Life
Destinations	→	Life Goals
Itinerary	→	Life Plan

The PURPOSEFUL LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor thus arises out of our basic embodied experience and gives us a way to think and reason about this abstract “entity,”¹¹ which in itself is fairly unstructured and therefore difficult to reason about. As Lakoff and Johnson note (1999, p. 62), the full practical import of a metaphor such as this lies in its entailments, that is, the fact that the metaphoric link between abstract life and a concrete journey allows us to draw upon our large stock of commonplace knowledge about journeys and apply this knowledge to “life.” So, for instance, we unconsciously assume that life, like a physical journey, requires planning if one is to reach one’s “destination,” that difficulties will be “encountered” “along the way,” that one should avoid being “sidetracked” or “bogged down,” et cetera. Convinced that I have become “sidetracked,” for instance, I unconsciously import reasoning structures from the source domain and project them onto the target domain: exerting more effort (traveling farther) in my current endeavor (path) will only make things worse (lead me farther astray); if I wish things to improve (get back on track), it will be necessary first to radically change my current manner of doing things (backtrack, reverse) until it resembles the manner in which I used to do things at some particular time in the past (get back to the “point” where I went astray), and then to begin to make an effort again (begin moving forward) in a very different manner than I am doing now (in a new direction). We can thus see how a single complex metaphor can have profound practical implications, influencing decision making and providing us with normative guidance. In addition, the sheer awkwardness of the literal paraphrases just given illustrate how deeply the PURPOSEFUL LIFE IS A JOURNEY schema penetrates our consciousness: it takes a great deal of effort to avoid invoking it in some way when discussing life decisions.

As we can see from this example, a single, complex, conceptual metaphor structure can inform a whole series of specific linguistic expressions, such as being “lost” in life, working at a “dead-end” job, or “going nowhere.” These “families” of

specific metaphorical expressions are not random or unrelated, but rather are all motivated by a common conceptual schema. This, indeed, is a crucial proposition of cognitive linguistics: that metaphorical expressions are not simply fixed linguistic conventions, but rather represent the surface manifestations of deeper, active, and largely unconscious conceptual structures. This means that a metaphoric structure such as A PURPOSEFUL LIFE IS A JOURNEY exists independently of any specific metaphoric expression of it, and can thus continuously generate new and unforeseen expressions. Anyone familiar with the PURPOSEFUL LIFE IS A JOURNEY schema can instantly grasp the sense of such metaphors as “dead-end job” or “going nowhere” on hearing them for the first time, and can also draw upon the conceptual schema to create related but entirely novel metaphoric expressions. Were I a country singer, for instance, I might write a song titled “The Airplane of Life is about to Depart the Gate, and I Don’t Have a Boarding Pass,” which draws upon the PURPOSEFUL LIFE IS A JOURNEY image schema but employs it in an entirely novel (albeit somewhat painful) linguistic expression.

This leads us to the “experiential realist” or “embodied realist” stance that informs the cognitive-linguistics approach, and which I believe to be the most significant aspect of this approach for scholars engaged in comparative work. Conceptual metaphors are understood as “interactive . . . structured modes of understanding” that arise as a result of our embodied mind having to adapt to “our physical, cultural, and interpersonal environments” (Fesmire 1994, p. 152). Because human bodies are quite similar the world over, and the types of environments human beings face are also shared in most important respects, one would expect to find a high degree of similarity with regard to conceptual metaphors across human cultures and languages, especially with regard to primary metaphor.¹² For instance, it is not unreasonable to claim that all human beings—regardless of culture, language, or period in history—have had the experience of needing to move from point A to point B in order to realize some purpose, and we should thus not be surprised if the primary metaphor PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS is universal or near-universal among human cultures. In other words, since human experience involves a huge number of shared embodied gestalt structures, we should expect these shared structures—as a result of projective mapping—to be reflected at the level of abstract thought as well.

Of course, since these gestalt patterns arise through the interactions of our embodied minds with our environment, we would also expect that dramatic changes in environment would be reflected in the creation of novel conceptual metaphors. Nonetheless, despite the great strides in technology that have been made over the centuries and the large impact that these technologies have had on our lives, the basic shared human environment has remained remarkably stable. We still physically have to move in order to get something that we want, we still obtain most of our information about the world through our sense of sight (the experiential basis of the common primary metaphor, KNOWING IS SEEING), and overall the basic repertoire of motions and physical interactions possessed by a modern American is not terribly different from that possessed by, say, a Chinese person in the fourth century B.C.E.

Despite the advent of electricity, movable type, computers, and the internet, then, the basic stability of the human body and the environment with which it interacts across cultures and time would lead us to expect a high degree of universality in basic metaphor schemas.

Metaphors for the Self in the Zhuangzi

With regard to conceptions of the self in modern American English, Lakoff and Johnson note that there is no single monolithic way that speakers of English conceptualize their “inner” life. We rely upon a variety of metaphoric conceptions to understand ourselves. These various metaphors do, however, draw upon a fairly small number of source domains such as space, object possession, exertion of physical force, and social relationships (1999, p. 267). Although these various schemas are at times literally inconsistent, they are generally not incompatible—that is, they serve to supplement one another and thereby fit together to form a coherent conception of self. We shall see that the same is true of metaphors for the self in the *Zhuangzi*. Below we shall use some metaphor schemas for the self identified by Lakoff and Johnson as the framework for discussing conceptions of the self in the *Zhuangzi*. For each metaphor schema, we shall also explore some of its metaphorical entailments as they relate to soteriological goals, conception of perfected state, et cetera. This will serve as an illustration of metaphorical reasoning: how entailments based upon physically grounded metaphorical schemas are projected and used to reason about the abstract realm of “the self.” As we shall see, although the various schemas for the self in the *Zhuangzi* are literally inconsistent, they are not incompatible, and in fact the inference patterns that they provide fit together to motivate a coherent soteriological strategy.

To begin with, it is necessary to examine the most general metaphoric structure for conceptualizing the self, the SUBJECT-SELF schema (first identified by Andrew Lakoff and Miles Becker [Lakoff and Becker 1992] and elaborated in Lakoff and Johnson 1999, pp. 268–270). After examining a wide variety of metaphors for the self in modern American English, Lakoff and Becker concluded that English speakers fundamentally experience themselves in terms of a metaphoric split between a Subject and one or more Selves.¹³ In this SUBJECT-SELF schema, the Subject is always conceived of as person-like and with an existence independent from the Self or Selves; it is the locus of consciousness, subjective experience, and our “essence”—everything that makes us who we are. The Self encompasses everything else about the individual, and can be represented by a person, object, location, faculty, physical organ, body, emotion, social role, personal history, et cetera. The basic schema can be mapped out as follows:

The SUBJECT-SELF Schema

- A Person → The Subject
- A Person or Thing → The Self
- A Relationship → Subject-Self Relationship

Many of the metaphors for self we shall describe below are merely special cases of this single general metaphor system.¹⁴ Phenomenologically, this is very significant; as Lakoff and Johnson note, “this schema reveals not only something deep about our conceptual systems but also something deep about our inner experience, mainly that we experience ourselves as a split” (p. 269). The precise manner in which this split is conceptualized depends on the source domain that is invoked.

The Locational Self

This schema arises from our interactions with bounded spaces and containers. As projected onto our concept of the self, it can be mapped as follows:

SELF AS CONTAINER	
A Person	→ The Subject
A Container	→ The Self
Objects in Container	→ Qualities of the Self

This schema, very common in English (e.g., “I didn’t think he had it *in him*”), is also found throughout the *Zhuangzi*. We often see virtues, vices, tendencies, and knowledge understood metaphorically as substances that can be “put into,” “stored in,” or “taken out of” the container of the Self.¹⁵

The metaphorical container can be the Self in the most general sense, as in such phrases as “The perfected people of ancient times first *stored it up in themselves* (*cun zhu ji* 存諸己) before they tried to give it [lit. store it] to others” (W54/G134)¹⁶ or “I saw something strange *in him* (*yan* 焉); I saw damp ashes in him” (W95/G299). Alternately, the container can also be an instantiation or part of the self, such as the heart-mind (*xin* 心) or the *qi* 氣. For instance, in the “fasting of the mind” passage in chapter 4, the heart-mind is likened to a stomach that can be made tenuous or empty (*xu* 虛) through metaphorical fasting. Once the fasting is complete, the only thing left will be the *qi*, which is in turn described as being so tenuous a substance that it has space to “receive things” and serve as a reservoir for the Way to gather: “The *qi* is something that is tenuous and so can receive things. Nothing other than the Way gathers in tenuousness” (W58/G147).

It is very common, in both English and classical Chinese, to see this metaphor combined with the following schema, that of the ESSENTIAL SELF.

The Essential Self

As described in Lakoff and Johnson (1999, pp. 282–284), the ESSENTIAL SELF metaphor is based on a “folk theory of essences”: that is, the idea that every object has “within it” an essence that makes it the kind of thing it is, and that this essence is the causal source of every object’s “natural” behavior (1999, pp. 214–215).¹⁷ Applied to human beings, our “essence” is usually vaguely associated with the Subject. There are, however, situations when “our concept of who we are essentially . . . is incompatible with what we actually do” (1999, p. 282), and such situations are explained by invoking the ESSENTIAL SELF metaphor:

ESSENTIAL SELF

- Person 1 → The Subject, with the Essence
 Person 2 → Self 1, the Real Self (fits the Essence)
 Person or Thing 3 → Self 2, not the Real Self (does not fit the Essence)

An example of this metaphor in English is the apology, “I’m sorry, I just wasn’t myself yesterday,” where “I” corresponds to the Subject, “myself” to Self 1 (the Real Self), and whoever or whatever I actually was yesterday to Self 2 (the False Self).

Lakoff and Johnson note three different special cases of this metaphor, but the one that is the most relevant for our project is the metaphor of the INNER SELF, which involves combining the ESSENTIAL SELF metaphor with the SELF AS CONTAINER schema:

ESSENTIAL SELF PLUS SELF AS CONTAINER

- Inside of container → Self 1 (fits Subject/Essence)
 Outside surface of container → Self 2 (does not fit Subject/Essence)

This is a very common and immediately comprehensible metaphor in both modern English and classical Chinese. “She seems friendly,” we might say, “but that is just a *façade* [concealing her real (i.e., internal) self].” Similarly, in chapter 4 of the *Zhuangzi*, Yan Hui explains a plan where he intends to be “inwardly straight (*neizhi* 內直) while outwardly compliant (*waiqu* 外曲 [lit. bent, crooked])” (W56/G143)—that is, seeming on the (false) outside to be agreeing with a wicked ruler while (really) on the inside maintaining his correctness. Confucius’ criticism of this plan (“Outwardly he will accord with you, but inside he will be unrepentant”—W56/G141) also invokes this combination of metaphors, and indeed the container terminology of “inner” and “outer” is used systematically throughout Warring States Chinese texts in combination with the ESSENTIAL SELF metaphor.¹⁸

In the *Zhuangzi*, things that are properly “inside” are seen as related to the “Essential Self,” whereas things that are properly “outside” are related to the false Self. We can summarize some of these associations as follows:

<i>Properly Internal Things</i>	<i>Properly External Things</i>
Heaven (<i>tian</i> 天)	Human (<i>ren</i> 人)
<i>qi</i>	“full” heart-mind
spirit (<i>shen</i> 神)	knowledge or scheming
Virtue (<i>de</i>)	fame or achievements
true self (<i>shen</i> 身) ¹⁹	cultural standards
the numinous (<i>ling</i> 靈)	likes and dislikes
	life and death
	the (political) world (<i>tianxia</i> 天下)
	the physical form (<i>xing</i> 形)

The power of this metaphor schema is that it motivates a variety of entailments that have crucial soteriological significance and yet that can be accepted without need for justification or argument by anyone familiar with the use of containers. A few examples are given below.

(a) Properly external things inside the container → Subject in a bad state

This entailment motivates the perceived danger of allowing “likes and dislikes to internally harm the true self” (W75/G221), the undesirability of “hoarding up (*zang* 藏) benevolence and using it to make demands on others” (W92/G287), and the admonition to “not serve as a storehouse (*fu* 府) for schemes” (W97/G307). It also provides the reasoning pattern for the statement that

Death and life, preservation and destruction, failure and success, poverty and wealth . . . all these represent the vagaries of affairs and the movement of fate. Day and night they alternate before you . . . but they are not worth disturbing your harmony, they should not be allowed to enter into (*ru* 入) the Storehouse of the Numinous (*lingfu* 靈府). (W73 4/G212)

(b) Properly internal things outside the container → Subject in a bad state

Hence the perceived danger of “allowing Virtue to be agitated (*dang* 蕩) by fame” (W55/G134) and the warning that “now you are putting your spirit on the outside” (W76/G222).

(c) Properly external things outside the container → Subject in a good state

This entailment motivates the description of the sage as progressively “putting on the outside” the world, things, and life, and finally reaching the point where he can “enter into [the realm of] no-death and no-life” (W82–3/G252).

(d) Properly internal things inside the container → Subject in a good state

One of the most interesting illustrations of this entailment is the metaphoric conception of Virtue, which is often conceived of as a liquid substance. In the *Zhuangzi*, this liquid substance is something with which the Self is originally filled through the action of Heaven, and it is important not to let it leak out or become agitated. Hence the admonition, “internally preserve it and do not let it become agitated [by] outside [forces] (*nei bao zhi er wai bu dang* 內保之而外不蕩)” (W74/G214), and the fascinating description in chapter 7 of a sage who is portrayed as having a “mechanism” that “plugs up” the Self so that his virtue doesn’t leak out: the “plugging up virtue mechanism” (*tude ji* 杜德幾) (W95/G299). Heaven fills the Self up with a full tank of Virtue at birth; if it doesn’t leak or become agitated, we can get to use it all up our-

selves, “preserve” our true self and live out our full life: “use up completely (*jin* 盡) all that you have received from Heaven” (W97/G307).

Based on entailments (a) through (d), and drawing upon our common knowledge of the behavior of substances in containers, we obtain the further entailments:

(e) Pervious barrier between inner and outer → Undesirable state

Hence the problem of “entanglements” resulting from the fact that “when asleep, people’s *hun* spirits interact (*jiao* 交); when awake, their bodies open up wide (*kai* 開)” (W37/G51).

(f) Impervious barrier between inner and outer → Desirable state

This entailment motivates the explanation that the sage Song Rongzi could reach a state where “the whole age could praise him and he would not be encouraged, and the whole world could condemn him and he would not be discouraged” because he had “firmly established the distinction between inner and outer, and clearly marked off the boundary between glory and disgrace” (W31/G16). Similarly, after being shocked into an awareness of his own ignorance (and thus reaching the highest stage of understanding), the sage Liezi is described as returning home, not going out for three years, and finally entering a spiritual state in which all selfishness and socially defined distinctions have been expelled and a tight “seal” (*feng* 封) between inner and outer has been established (W97/G306). Consider also the admonition to “make it so that day and night you are without cracks (*xi* 隙)” (W74/G212) or the description of the True Person of ancient times, who is said to have “preferred to close himself off (*bi* 閉)” (W79/G234).

The Physical Object Self

Manipulating physical objects is one of the first things that we learn to do and is also something we continue to do frequently throughout our lives. We should thus not be surprised that object manipulation serves as the source domain for many SUBJECT-SELF metaphors in the *Zhuangzi*. The basic schema is SELF-CONTROL IS OBJECT CONTROL, and since the most common way to control an object is to exert force upon it, this schema is often formulated as SELF-CONTROL IS THE FORCED MOVEMENT OF AN OBJECT, which can be mapped as follows:

SELF-CONTROL IS THE FORCED MOVEMENT OF AN OBJECT

- | | | |
|----------------------------|---|--|
| A Person | → | The Subject |
| A Physical Object or Agent | → | The Self or an Instance of the Self
(body part, organ, faculty, etc.) |
| Forced Movement | → | Control/Manipulation of the Self by
the Subject |

Examples from English include:

I *lifted* my arm. The yogi *bent* his body into a pretzel. I *dragged* myself out of bed. I *held* myself *back* from hitting him. (Lakoff and Johnson 1999, p. 271)

Examples of this metaphor are quite numerous throughout the *Zhuangzi* as well. To cite just two:

rectify yourself [lit. straighten your body] (*zheng ru shen* 正汝身) (W62/G165)

recklessly [lit. lightly] use my self (*qing yong wu shen* 輕用吾身) (W71/G202)

In all of the cases just cited, we are dealing with a unitary Self that is manipulated in some way by the Subject. In many cases, though, that which is being manipulated is one or more instances of the Self (we might call them “component selves”). A nice example of this is found in the story of the sagely butcher, Cook Ding, in chapter 3: “I [your servant] encounter with my spirit and do not look with my eyes. . . .²⁰ [M]y vision is stopped and my actions slowed down” (W50–51/G119). Here we see Cook Ding (the Subject) manipulating (*yi* 以), stopping (*zhi* 止), or slowing down (*chi* 遲) his organs (eyes), agencies within the self (the spirit, *shen*), his faculties (vision), and his bodily movements.

Generally, control of the object Self by the Subject is desirable, but even in English we sometimes speak of noncontrol of the Self in a positive sense, as when a person who—perhaps after much effort and no progress in learning how to dance—at last succeeds and explains, “I was finally able to *let* myself *go*.” As a reader familiar with the *Zhuangzi* would expect, it is often the lack of forced movement that is emphasized in the text. The idea seems to be that certain positive instantiations of the Self—the spirit, the *qi*, and Virtue, all of which are associated by Zhuangzi with Heaven—are normally repressed or restrained and need to be released. This gives us the metaphor schema:

FORCE EXERTED UPON AN OBJECT = REPRESSION OF AN OBJECT

A Person → The Subject

A Physical Object or Agent → The Self or Instance of the Self
(body part, organ, faculty, etc.)

Force Exerted upon an Object or Agent → Repression of the Self

Lack of Force Exerted upon an Object or Agent → Freedom of the Self

An example of this is found in the Cook Ding story, where certain negative instantiations of the self are restrained while other positive instantiations are released from control: “My sensory knowledge is stopped [restrained] and my spiritual desires set in motion (*xing* 行 [lit. “allowed to move”])” (W50/G119). This theme is echoed in a passage where Confucius (acting as a mouthpiece for Zhuangzi) describes the great

sage Wang Tai (the Subject) as ignoring the opinions of his sense organs and allowing his heart-mind to wander free under the influence of Virtue: “He does not know what his ears and eyes find suitable, but rather lets his heart-mind wander (*you* 遊) in the harmony of virtue” (W69/G191).

This ideal of a lack of forced motion is conceptualized most generally in terms of the famous metaphor *wu wei* 無為 (“effortless action”). *Wu wei* is sometimes used in its literal sense of “absence of doing,” and could thus in certain situations be rendered as “no-doing” or “inaction.” More commonly, however, *wu wei* involves quite a bit of “doing,” and in such contexts it must be understood metaphorically. The *wu wei* metaphor is sometimes based on the SUBJECT-SELF and SELF-CONTROL AS FORCED MOVEMENT schemas, where it refers to a lack of forced movement imposed by the Subject upon the Self: there is “no doing” because the Subject is not doing anything to the Self, although the Self or Selves may be (and usually are) very active. Alternately, *wu wei* can refer to a unitary Subject “doing nothing,” usually because it is the world (the Way or the “inevitable movement” of things) that is providing the motive force and “carrying” the Subject in the proper direction.

Although the term *wu wei* itself only appears a few times in the “Inner Chapters” of the *Zhuangzi*, it can serve as a general expression for a host of metaphors having to do with a lack of exertion: “being at ease” (*an* 安), “wandering” or “playing” (*you* 遊), “following” (*yin* 因 or *sui* 隨) or “leaning upon” (*yi* 依), “flowing with” (*shun* 順), and “riding upon” (*cheng* 乘). In chapter 2, it is said that the sage *yinshi* 因是 (“following ‘this is’”) and in this way refraining from *weishi* 為是 (“making ‘this is’”) is like the “hinge of the Way” (*daoshu* 道樞)—something that remains at rest while the door moves around it. The “flowing with” metaphor is often invoked in reference to the Way (*dao* 道, frequently represented metaphorically as a river) or the natural tendency (*ziran* 自然) of things.²¹ The successful tiger trainer is one who “flows with” (*shun* 順) the tiger’s nature and does not try to “swim upstream” (*ni* 逆) against it (W63/G167). Similarly, Zhuangzi himself advises us in chapter 5 to “always follow along with the natural (*yin ziran* 因自然) and do not add anything to life” (W76/G221). These *wu wei* metaphors are often used in conjunction with one another in a single phrase, an indication of their close metaphorical affinity.

Self-control Is Object Possession

Object manipulation is not the only way to conceptualize self-control. Another common way, found in English (Lakoff and Johnson 1999, pp. 272–273) as well as classical Chinese, is in terms of object possession, which can be mapped as follows:

SELF-CONTROL IS OBJECT POSSESSION	
A Person	→ The Subject
A Physical Object	→ The Self
Possession	→ Control of the Self
Loss of Possession	→ Loss of Control of the Self

Examples from English include “losing yourself” or “getting carried away,” and this is generally understood in a negative sense. We find such negative portrayals of loss of object possession in classical Chinese as well. For example, we read of the second-rate shaman who is confronted with a true Daoist master: “before he had even fully come to a halt, he [the shaman] *lost himself* (*zishi* 自失) and ran away” (W96/G304). Similarly, in chapter 6 a person who is seduced by fame and external concerns is described as having “lost himself” (*shiji* 失己) and “ruined his true self” (*wangshen* 亡身) (W78/G232). This second expression is significant, for the *shen* 身 is an instance of the Self, whose possession is extremely important for the Subject—we read repeatedly in the text that it is something that must not be damaged or “forgotten” (*wang* 忘) (e.g., W60/G155). Nonetheless, this phenomenon is not always given a negative valuation, for “losing oneself” in the enjoyment of a book or work of art, for instance, is a desirable and pleasurable experience. In cases such as this, the ordinary state of metaphorically “possessing” the self is conceived of as a restriction or burden, and the elimination of possession understood as a kind of release. We might therefore remap the schema in the following way to reflect this alternate valuation of object possession:

SUBJECT ESCAPES CONTROL OF THE SELF BY ELIMINATING OBJECT POSSESSION

A Person	→	The Subject
A Physical Object	→	The Self
Possession	→	Control of the Subject by the Self
Loss of Possession	→	Subject Freed from Control by the Self

Applying the SUBJECT-SELF and OBJECT POSSESSION schemas to Warring States texts such as the *Zhuangzi* allows us to understand more clearly such stories as that of Zi Qi of Southwall, who—after making his body like dead wood and his mind like dead ashes through some sort of meditative technique—declares “I have lost myself” (*wu sang wo* 吾喪我) (W36/G45). Much has been made of this passage by scholars such as Wu Kuang-ming or David L. Hall, who see it as evidence of two different types of self in the *Zhuangzi*: the *wu*-self and the *wo*-self (Wu 1990; Hall 1994). As Paul Kjellberg has noted, however, the phrase *wu sang wo* is simply proper classical Chinese, *wu* being the standard first-person subject pronoun and *wo* usually serving as the first-person object pronoun (Kjellberg 1993).²² In this respect, the sense of *wu sang wo* could equally have been expressed with interchangeable first-person reflexive pronouns (as in *wu sang ji* 吾喪己 or *wu zisang* 吾自喪), and the phrase itself is neither more nor less freighted with philosophical significance than the English phrase “I lost myself.” As we have seen, however, even this English expression is significant in that it gives expression to the SUBJECT-SELF and OBJECT POSSESSION conceptual schemas, and this is no less true of classical Chinese. Metaphorically, then, Zi Qi’s meditative technique has allowed him (the Subject) to escape the control of the Self—which is a common way to understand Zhuangzian spiritual attainment.²³

Conclusion

In this brief sketch we have by no means exhausted the source domains used for conceptualizing the SUBJECT-SELF relationship. A very common schema that appears in both English and the classical Chinese of the *Zhuangzi*, for example, is the SOCIAL SELF metaphor, where our vast experience of interpersonal relationships allows us to map knowledge about evaluative qualities of specific social relationship onto our inner lives. This is the schema that informs, for instance, Confucius' warning to Yan Hui in chapter 4, "You are still taking the heart-mind as your teacher!" (W57/G145). It is hoped, however, that this short discussion has helped to illuminate the shared, metaphoric "deep grammar" underlying the superficially quite different conceptions of the self as expressed in the classical Chinese of the *Zhuangzi* and modern American English. While the degree of similarity we see here even with regard to quite abstract and presumably culturally contingent domains such as the "self" might seem surprising or unlikely from the perspective of neo-Cartesian postmodern theory—where linguistic-cultural systems are conceived of (metaphorically!) as *sui generis*, autonomous structures—it is rather to be expected from the standpoint of cognitive linguistics.

The cognitive-linguistics approach thus not only represents a powerful and concrete new methodology for cross-cultural comparative work but also provides us with a convincing and coherent theoretical grounding for the comparativist project itself. That is, if the embodied realist claims of cognitive linguistics are correct—if our basic conceptual schema arise from embodied experience—then this provides an explanation for why we would expect to find a high degree of cross-cultural similarity with regard to deep conceptual structures. This, in turn, effectively gets us out of the postmodern "prison-house of language." Under the cognitive-linguistics model, the basic schemas underlying language and other surface expressions of conceptual structure are motivated by the body and the physical environment in which it is located, which—shared in all general respects by any member of the species *Homo sapiens*, ancient or modern—provides a bridge to the experience of "the other." Metaphor, then, can serve as a linguistic "sign" of otherwise inaccessible, shared, deep conceptual structure. As Lakoff and Johnson note, "Though we have no access to the inner lives of those in radically different cultures, we do have access to their metaphor systems and the way they reason using those metaphor systems" (1999, p. 284). At the same time, the recognition that these structures are contingent on bodies and the physical environment, that no set of conceptual schemas provides unmediated access to the "things in themselves," and that some degree of cultural variation in schemas is to be expected allows us to avoid the sort of rigid universalism that characterizes Enlightenment-inspired approaches to the study of thought and culture. Ideally, at least, the methods of cognitive linguistics give scholars in the humanities access to a shared conceptual grammar that can allow them to engage in genuine conversation with other cultures.

Notes

- 1 – The boundaries between this approach and the first, more term-oriented approach are often blurred by the fact that a lack of shared technical vocabulary is commonly cited as evidence for theoretical incommensurability.
- 2 – See also Elvin 1993, where it is claimed that anything like “our” (read: Cartesian) conception of the self is a very recent development in China, and Joachim 1998, where it is asserted that the *Zhuangzi* in particular lacks anything like the “modern” (read: Cartesian) conception of the self. Joachim’s account is particularly interesting because some of the features he describes as central to the modern Western self—particularly substantiality (i.e., can be “possessed,” “lost,” etc.) and the inner-outer distinction—are in fact some of the most common ways in which the self is conceptualized metaphorically in the *Zhuangzi*, as we shall see below.
- 3 – For discussions of the relationship between “folk” and “expert” theories, see Lakoff and Johnson 1981, p. 205, and Wolf 1994, chap. 4.
- 4 – Roger T. Ames, for instance, cites the use of physicalist metaphors for the self in Chinese thought as evidence that for the Chinese, unlike for us modern Westerners, “body and mind were not regarded as different ‘kinds’ of existence in any essential way” (Ames 1993, p. 163). Ames does note the existence of such mappings in modern Western language, but views them as “remnants” that “might hark back to a pre-dualistic interpretation of the person” (p. 163). As we shall see, according to cognitive linguistics this type of cross-domain mapping is the rule rather than the exception, and such mappings are in fact conceptually alive and constantly active in modern Western languages. Ames’ observation is nonetheless interesting, though, because arguably what he is perceiving is a difference not between ancient (nondualistic) and modern (dualistic) Western conceptions of the self but rather between everyday conceptual structure and modern Western philosophic theories. Scholars who focus on the level of theory will, like Ames and Hall, tend to emphasize difference, and for good reason. But such a focus on the theoretical tip of the iceberg overlooks the vast region of deeper cognitive similarities on which such theories are based, and thus may tend to exaggerate cultural and historical differences.
- 5 – See Wolf 1994, pp. 38–41, for a discussion of the link between phenomenology and the work of Lakoff and Johnson. For a basic introduction to contemporary metaphor theory, the reader is referred to Lakoff and Johnson 1980 and 1999, Lakoff and Turner 1989, Johnson 1987 and 1981, Sweetser 1990, Kövecses 1986 and 1990, and Turner 1991. Lakoff 1993 is perhaps the best article-length general introduction to the cognitive theory of metaphor, and Ortony 1993 is a helpful resource that provides a variety of theoretical perspectives on metaphor. For the more general theory of mental spaces and

conceptual mapping, see Fauconnier 1997 and Fauconnier and Sweetser 1996.

- 6 – See Fauconnier 1997, pp. 1–5, for a brief discussion of how this treatment of language as mere “signals” connected to a deeper, nonlinguistic structure differs from structural- or generative-linguistic approaches.
- 7 – See especially Johnson 1987 for a discussion of this phenomenon.
- 8 – A standard convention in the field of cognitive linguistics is to indicate metaphor schemas by means of small caps, and to use “schemas” (rather than the more awkward “schemata”) as the plural.
- 9 – See Lakoff and Johnson 1999, pp. 122–127, for criticisms of the views that metaphors are linguistic, not conceptual; that metaphor has to do with unusual (poetic) or otherwise “deviant” usages; or that conventional metaphors are “dead” (i.e., fixed literary expressions).
- 10 – I say “most” aspects, because the skeletal structure of the target domain that is directly represented in consciousness not only serves to constrain what source domains can be mapped onto it, but also which aspects of the source domain can be successfully mapped and which ignored as irrelevant (see Lakoff 1993, pp. 228–235, and 1990, pp. 67–73).
- 11 – Of course, even seeing life as an entity already involves the basic OBJECT-EVENT STRUCTURE metaphor schema, whereby events are conceptualized as physical “things.” See Lakoff and Johnson 1999, pp. 196–197, for a discussion of the OBJECT-EVENT schema.
- 12 – Indeed, findings in evolutionary psychology suggest that primary-metaphor schemas may have, through evolutionary time, become part of the innate structure of the human brain. See Carroll 1999 for a discussion of the cognitive linguistics–evolutionary psychology link.
- 13 – “Subject” and “Self” will be capitalized when used in this technical sense.
- 14 – Lakoff and Johnson claim that *all* metaphors for self are based on this schema, but in fact there are many cases in Warring States Chinese texts where one finds a unitary Subject interacting metaphorically with an external entity, as in such *Wu wei* Family metaphors as “flowing with” (*shun* 順) the Way or “riding upon” (*cheng* 乘) the transformation of things.
- 15 – Pace Ames 1993, p. 165, where he notes Eliot Deutsch’s observation that container metaphors for the self are common in the West, but claims that “by contrast, the notion of body in the Chinese tradition tends to be couched in terms of ‘process’ rather than substance language.” As we shall see here and below, substance metaphors are the primary means for conceptualizing the self in classical Chinese as well as modern Western languages.
- 16 – Citations from the *Zhuangzi* will be in the format Wxxx/Gxxx, where W refers

to the page number in Watson 1968 and G to the page number in Guo Qingfan 1961.

- 17 – As Lakoff and Johnson note, this folk theory is the basis of such diverse phenomena as the Aristotelian concept of “material cause” and the common expression “Boys will be boys.” Although they remain vague about the origin and universality of such “folk theories,” evolutionary psychologists such as Tooby and Cosmides (1992, p. 71) cite experimental evidence on the perceptions of pre-linguistic children (e.g., Keil 1989) strongly suggesting that it is an innate cognitive human trait to distinguish between animate and inanimate beings, and to view animate beings as belonging to “natural kinds” possessing invisible “essences” that have a causal relation to their behavior and appearance. It is likely that many of the “folk theories” and primary metaphor schema mentioned by Lakoff and Johnson can be similarly grounded in human evolutionary psychology. See, for instance, Keil 1979 for evidence that basic concepts such as “event,” “physical object,” “living thing,” “person,” et cetera, are conceptual structures that human beings are predisposed to develop.
- 18 – Pace Fingarette 1972, who argues that inner-outer metaphors in texts like the *Analects* of Confucius are merely *ad hoc* and not conceptually significant.
- 19 – *Shen* 身 refers literally to the trunk of the body, but in Warring States Chinese texts it often has the extended meaning of “self.” In the *Zhuangzi*, it seems to be identified with the ESSENTIAL SELF (as we shall see below, it must always be “preserved” and must never be “lost” or “forgotten”), and it will therefore be translated as “true self.”
- 20 – Literally “taking and by means of my spirit encountering [it]” (*yi shen yu* 以神遇) and “taking and by means of my eyes seeing [it]” (*yi mu shi* 以目視). The original and most literal meaning of *yi* 以 is “to grasp with the hand.”
- 21 – The combination of ESSENTIAL SELF plus SELF AS CONTAINER is the conceptual basis for the metaphor “so-of-itself” or “natural” (*ziran*). Meaning literally “so-out-of-itself,” *ziran* refers to the way a thing is when it follows its own internal Essence. Metaphorically, the image evoked by the term *ziran* is of actions emerging “naturally” out of the container of the Self—an example of the NATURAL CAUSATION IS MOTION OUT (e.g., “The chaos in Eastern Europe *emerged from* the end of the Cold War”) metaphor noted by Lakoff and Johnson (1999, p. 214) in their discussion of events and causes. This metaphor is simply an extension of the CONTAINER plus ESSENCE schemas; that is, the end of the Cold War, for instance, is being conceptualized as a container with an internal essence (chaos) that then emerges in the way a plant emerges from a seed or a child from the womb. Arguably, this NATURAL CAUSATION IS MOTION OUT metaphor arises from our experience with mammalian birth and the germination of seeds.
- 22 – See Pulleyblank 1995, pp. 76–77, for a discussion of the *wu/wo* distinction.
- 23 – See also the metaphor of “forgetting” (i.e., losing from consciousness) in, for instance, W49/G108 or W207/G663.

Bibliography

- Ames, Roger T. 1993. "The Meaning of Body in Classical Chinese Philosophy." In Kasulis et al. 1993, pp. 157–178.
- . 1994. "The Focus-Field Self in Classical Confucianism." In Ames et al. 1994, pp. 213–234.
- . 1997. "The Chinese Conception of Selfhood." In Eliot Deutsch and Ron Bontekoe, eds., *A Companion to World Philosophies*, pp. 148–154. Oxford, UK; Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- , ed. 1998. *Wandering at Ease in the Zhuangzi*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Ames, Roger T., ed., with Wimal Dissanayake and Thomas P. Kasulis. 1994. *Self as Person in Asian Theory and Practice*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Berling, Judith. 1985. "Self and Whole in Chuang Tzu." In Munro 1985, pp. 101–120.
- Bloom, Irene. 1985. "On the Matter of the Mind: the Metaphysical Basis of the Expanded Self." In Munro 1985, pp. 293–330.
- Carroll, Joseph. 1999. "The Deep Structure of Literary Representations." *Evolution and Human Behavior* 20:159–173.
- Deutsch, Eliot. 1992. "The Comparative Study of the Self." In Leroy Rouner, ed., *Selves, People and Persons: What Does it Mean to be a Self?* pp. 95–105. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
- . 1993. "The Concept of the Body." In Kasulis et al. 1993, pp. 5–20.
- Elvin, Mark. 1985. "Between Heaven and Earth: Conceptions of the Self in China." In Michael Carrithers et al., eds., *The Category of the Person*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 1993. "Tales of *Shen* and *Xin*: Body-Person and Heart-Mind in China During the Last 150 Years." In Kasulis et al. 1993, pp. 213–294.
- Emerson, John. 1996. "Yang Chu's Discovery of the Body." *Philosophy East and West* 46 (4): 533–566.
- Fauconnier, Gilles. 1997. *Mappings in Thought and Language*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Fauconnier, Gilles, and Eve Sweetser, eds. 1996. *Spaces, Worlds and Grammar*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Fesmire, Steven. 1994. "What is 'Cognitive' about Cognitive Linguistics?" *Metaphor and Symbolic Activity* 9:149–154.
- Fingarette, Herbert. 1972. *Confucius: The Secular as Sacred*. New York: Harper Torchbooks.

- Gibbs, R. W., and H. L. Colston. 1995. "The Cognitive Psychological Reality of Image Schemas and Their Transformations." *Cognitive Linguistics* 6:347–378.
- Grady, Joe. 1997. "Foundations of Meaning: Primary Metaphors and Primary Scenes." Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley.
- Graham, A. C. 1989. *Disputers of the Tao: Philosophic Argument in Ancient China*. La Salle, IL: Open Court Press.
- Guo Qingfan 郭慶藩. 1961. *Zhuangzi jishi* 莊子集釋. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju.
- Hall, David L. 1994. "To Be or Not to Be: The Postmodern Self and Wu-Forms of Taoism." In Ames et al. 1994, pp. 213–234.
- Hall, David L., and Roger T. Ames. 1998. *Thinking from the Han*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Joachim, Chris. 1998. "Just Say No to 'No-Self' in *Zhuangzi*." In Ames 1998.
- Johnson, Mark, ed. 1981. *Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- . 1987. *The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination and Reason*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Kasulis, Thomas P., ed., with Roger T. Ames and Wimal Dissanayake. 1993. *Self as Body in Asian Theory and Practice*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Keil, F. C. 1979. *Semantic and Conceptual Development*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- . 1989. *Concepts, Kinds, and Cognitive Development*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Kjellberg, Paul. 1993. Review of *The Butterfly as Companion: Meditations on the First Three Chapters of the Chuang Tzu*, by Kuang-ming Wu, *Philosophy East and West* 43 (1): 127–135.
- Kövecses, Zoltán. 1986. *Metaphors of Anger, Pride and Love: A Lexical Approach to the Structure of Concepts*. Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- . 1990. *Emotional Concepts*. New York: Springer-Verlag.
- Lakoff, Andrew and Miles Becker. 1992. "Me, Myself, and I." Manuscript, University of California, Berkeley.
- Lakoff, George. 1987. *Women, Fire and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- . 1990. "The Invariance Hypothesis: Is Abstract Reasoning Based Upon Image Schemas?" *Cognitive Linguistics* 1:39–74.
- . 1993. "The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor." In Ortony 1993, pp. 202–251.

- Lakoff, George, and Mark Johnson. 1980. *Metaphors We Live By*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- . 1981. "The Metaphorical Structure of the Human Conceptual System." In *Perspectives on Cognitive Science*, edited by Donald Norman, pp. 193–206. Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corporation.
- . 1999. *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought*. New York: Basic Books.
- Lakoff, George, and Mark Turner. 1989. *More than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Munro, Donald, ed. 1985. *Individualism and Holism: Studies in Confucian and Taoist Values*. Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich. [1889] 1968. *Twilight of the Idols*. Translated by R. J. Hollingdale. Baltimore: Penguin Books.
- Ortony, Andrew, ed. 1993. *Metaphor and Thought*. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 1993. "The Role of Similarity in Similes and Metaphors." In Ortony 1993, pp. 342–356.
- Oshima, Harold H. 1983. "A Metaphorical Analysis of the Concept of Mind in the *Chuang-tzu*." In Victor Mair, ed., *Experimental Essays on Chuang-tzu*, pp. 63–84. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.
- Pulleyblank, Edwin. 1995. *Outline of Classical Chinese Grammar*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.
- Sweetser, Eve. 1990. *From Etymology to Pragmatics: Metaphorical and Cultural Aspects of Semantic Structure*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Taylor, Charles. 1989. *Sources of the Self*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Tooby, John and Leda Cosmides. 1992. "Psychological Foundations of Culture." In *The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture*, ed. Jerome Barkow, Leda Cosmides, and John Tooby, pp. 19–136. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Turner, Mark. 1991. *Reading Minds: The Study of English in the Age of Cognitive Science*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Watson, Burton. 1968. *The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Wolf, Hans-Georg. 1994. *Folk Model of the 'Internal Self' in Light of the Contemporary View of Metaphor: The Self as Subject and Object*. European University Studies. Frankfurt: Peter Lang Publishing.
- Wu, Kuang-ming. 1990. *The Butterfly as Companion: Meditations on the First Three Chapters of the Chuang Tzu*. Albany: State University of New York Press.